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Foreign Financial Institutions in Japan
Since the late 1970s, Japan's financial system
has undergone continual liberalization. Promi-
nentfeatures ofthe process have included inter-
est rate deregulation and the relaxation of
capital controls on international transactions.
These reforms have transformed Japan's domes-
tic financial system in recent years from one
dependent on bank lending, funded largely by
deposits with officially controlled interest rates,
to one with a growing variety of assets carrying
market rates available to foreign and domestic
investors.
Another important element in the liberalization
has been the granting to foreign financial institu-
tions of greater access to japan's financial mar-
kets. Access to the potentially profitable
japanese financial services sector presents an
attractive opportunity to banks and securities
firms from the United.States and other countries.
Indeed, the number offoreign banks in Japan
increased from 63 in 1979 to 79 as of September
1986, including 19 banks from the United
States. As of November 1986, there were 36 for-
eign securities firms, 18 from the u.s. with fully
licensed branches in Japan - up from only 8 in
1983. In 1986, Tokyo's stock exchange accepted
its first six foreign members, three of which were
American.
This Letter discusses the treatment offoreign
banks and securities firms in Japan. While pro-
gress has been made in improving the treatment
of foreign institutions, as the increase in their
number implies, foreign banks and security firms
still face problems penetrating Japanese markets.
Improved position of foreign banks
Recent reforms have undeniably alleviated overt
discrimination against foreign banks in Japan,
and, from a legal standpoint, Japanese and for-
eign banks are now generally accorded "equal
treatment." Some specific measures that have
enhanced the competitive position offoreign
banks are reviewed below.
First, the end of limits in june 1984 on the con-
version of foreign currency into yen by banks
with foreign currency dealings and the gradual
reduction in ceilings on the issuance of certifi-
cates of deposits in 1985 and 1986 provided for-
eign banks with major new sources of yen
funding. Without the strong yen deposit base
from regional branches that Japanese banks pos-
sess, foreign banks generally rely on such alter-
native sources to finance their Japanese
operations. Permission in the spring of 1985 to
issue a new funding instrument - money mar-
ket certificates - has also been beneficial.
Second, in June 1985, Japan authorized the
entry of foreign banks into the highly profitable
business of managing Japanese trust and pension
funds, until then limited to resident banks and
life insurance companies. Nine foreign banks,
including 6 American banks, were approved for
licenses to establish trust banking subsidiaries at
the time. In addition to being the first instance of
authorization for foreign trust banks, it was also
the first time foreign banks were permitted to
establish banking subsidiaries of any form in
Japan.
Third, beginning in April 1984, foreign banks
were permitted to deal in japanese public
securities and to obtain membership in the gov-
ernment bond underwriting syndicates. This put
foreign banks on the same footing as domestic
Japanese banks that had been given the same
authority in 1983. In June 1986, it was
announced that the approval process would be
speeded up for foreign banks that had sufficient
experience in overseas markets. As of September
1986, 11 foreign banks, including 8 from the
U.s., had been approved for dealing in all Jap-
anese government bond issues.
Problems of foreign banks
As their increasing number implies, foreign
banks have indeed taken advantage of greater
access to Japan's financial markets. However,
despite the steps taken to widen the scope of
opportunities available to them, foreign banks
still remain fringe participants in Japanese bank-
ing markets. In March 1986, they accounted for
4 percent of all banking assets in Japan, downFRBSF
from 5 percent three years earlier. (U.s. banks
account for about 30 percent of total foreign
bank assets.)
The inability of foreign banks to make significant
inroads is attributable to a number of factors. For
one, foreign banks generally bear higher funding
costs than their japanese competitors, which
possess strong yen deposit bases gathered from
their branch networks. Despite recent reductions
in the use of interest rate ceilings, it is estimated
that 70-80 percent of these deposits still remain
subject to interest rate controls, putting foreign
banks, who have limited access to such regu-
lated accounts, at a disadvantage. Reductions of
swap limits and the enhanced ability to issue
certificates of deposit and money market certifi-
cates have provided alternative sources of funds,
but these funds are priced at higher market rates.
Ironically, another factor that has put foreign
banks at a disadvantage has been a reform mea-
sure that allowed foreign currency lending by
japanese banks to local residents in 1980. This
area had previously been a profitable monopoly
offoreign banks. As a result, the liberalization
has diluted foreignbanks' share of the foreign
currency lending business in japan.
A more fundamental problem faced by foreign
banks is that japan's banking system, despite
recent reforms, still remains very segmented.
The system is composed of several major types
of banking institutions: 13 large city banks,
which operate nationwide; numerous smaller
local or regional banks; three long-term credit
banks; numerous small savings banks; and 7
domestic trust banks, which are the main man-
agers of trust and pension funds. This structure
limits the ability of foreign banks to expand into
areas that are the preserve of special classes of
banking institutions. For example, while some
foreign banks have been authorized to engage in
the profitable business of managing corporate
trust and pension accounts, most have not. Gen-
eral restrictions on the opening of new branches
intended to protect the smaller banks in japan
put foreign banks at a particular disadvantage by
limiting their deposit base.
In face of the limited opportunities encountered
in their lending business, foreign banks have
sought greater access to business in securities
markets. While many have been allowed to deal
in government securities, their ability to engage
in general securities business is limited by Arti-
cle 65 of the Securities and Exchange Law -
japan's equivalent of the U.S. Glass-Steagall Act.
This regulation prohibits commercial banks from
engaging in the securities business, except for
activities related to public bond issues, which
dominate the bond market. Because japan's
Ministry of Finance does not wish to extend
privileges to foreign banks without granting the
same powers to japanese banks, it has been cau-
tious in allowing foreign banks to deal in
securities.
Recently, however, the provisions of Article 65
have been interpreted to permit general
securities licenses for some banks from Euro-
pean countries that allow universal banking
activity, and to allow several other foreign
banks, including those from the U.s., to acquire
brokerage houses that hold securities licenses.
Foreign banks are restricted, however, to 50 per-
cent ownership in japanese securities branches.
Treatment of foreign securities firms
Foreign securities companies have also been
permitted greater access to japan's domestic
financial markets in recent years. Initially, their
business focused on the intermediation of inter-
national securities transactions - selling foreign
securities to japanese investors or japanese
securities to foreign investors. Increasingly, for-
eign firms have also sought to expand their
Tokyo operations to participate in the japanese
debt and equity markets in competition with jap-
anese firms for japanese customers.
A major reason for the willingness of the jap-
anese government to encourage the entry of for-
eign securities firms has been the sharp
expansion of the japanese government debt mar-
ket and the need to interest a broader set of
investors in the issues. The total amount of gov-
ernment debt outstanding increased from less
than 10 percent of GNP in the mid-1970s to
more than 30 percent in the early 1980s, and
represents more than half of all bond issues in
japan (excluding bank debentures). The jap-
anese sell long-term government debt through
underwriting syndicates rather than auctionsbecause the government feels the volume is too
large for the market to absorb smoothly. In
1984, 6 foreign securities firms, as well as 9 for-
eign banks, were allowed into these syndicates
for the first time.
Medium-term (2-5 year) government bonds,
introduced in japan in 1978, have been sold in
volume through auction only since 1982. In
February 1986,auctions of bonds of less than
one year's maturity were initiated. While foreign
securities firms were excluded from bidding in
the medium-term government bond auctions
(2-4 years) until August 1986, they have since
been able to corner a significant share of the
business in this and the short-term market.
In 1986, a number offoreign firms were also
allowed to arrange private yen bond issues in
japan.
More problems
Foreign securities firms, as well as banks, have
experienced problems in attaining a reasonable
share of business in the long-term government
bond market. Since allocations of each bond
issue are based only on a syndicate member's
size of operations and experience in japan, the
percentage of bonds allocated to foreign firms
does not generally correspond to their position
in the marketplace, either in japan or interna-
tionally. In fact, even large foreign securities
firms receive an extremely small fraction of each
issue, usually less than 0.1 percent each, even
though it is estimated that 20 percent of these
issues are ultimately purchased by nonresidents
(this figure includes the branches of japanese
banks and securities firms located outside
japan).
The current japanese government position is that
the issue of bond allocation should be resolved
by the larger japanese security firms and bank
members of the syndicate. The U.S. government
has strongly urged japanese authorities to allow
long-term japanese government bonds to be sold
through auction, as is done for medium- and
short-term issues, to enable foreign firms to com-
pete for a larger market share. However, foreign
institutions also complain about auctions for the
shorter maturity issues. They contend that these
auctions are too infrequent and too small, and
that minimum denomination requirements that
are too high discourage individual and foreign
investors.
Perhaps most problematic from the point of view
of foreign firms is their inability to use the full
experience they have acquired in other markets
to their competitive advantage in japan's finan-
cial markets. The guarded pace ofjapanese
deregulation still limits their ability to capitalize
on techniques and services, such as innovative
financial services, developed successfully
abroad. For example, foreign firms have sought
to sell foreign financial futures in japan, offer
money market accounts and indexed securities,
and to sell government securities short. japan's
Ministry of Finance contends its slowness in
authorizing some of these measures stems not
from any intention to protect japanese firms but
from the need to satisfy itself that the measures
will not create problems for investor safety.
Conclusions
The liberalizing direction of japan's recent finan-
cial policies is unmistakable, and the resulting
treatment of foreign banks and securities firms
has improved. However, while official discrimi-
natory policies have diminished, foreign finan-
cial institutions continue to find japanese
markets difficult to penetrate. Many of their
problems stem from the cautious pace of the lib-
eralization and the fact that japanese financial
markets still remain somewhat more regulated
than those of other developed countries where
foreign financial institutions now compete.
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollaramounts in millions)










Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 205,835 2,176 1,674 0.8
Loans and Leases1 6 184,419 1,838 - 1,034 - 0.5
Commercial and Industrial 54,300 519 400 0.7
Real estate 68,054 232 1,682 2.5
Loans to Individuals 37,038 - 90 - 3,599 - 8.8
Leases 5,440 - 10 - 211 - 3.7
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 14,301 342 3,494 32.3
Other Securities2 7,115 - 4 - 786 - 9.9
Total Deposits 213,691 8,271 7,061 3.4
Demand Deposits 57,778 7,038 6,004 11.5
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 38,253 2,314 3,532 10.1
OtherTransaction Balances4 20,072 713 3,858 23.7
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 135,842 521 - 2,801 - 2.0
MoneyMarketDeposit
Accounts-Total 46,615 316 197 0.4
Time Deposits in Amountsof .
$100,000 or more 32,180 - 88 - 5,732 - 15.1
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 23,247 404 - 5,458 - 19.0
Two Week Averages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+)jDeficiency(-)
Borrowings











1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading account securities
3 Excludes U.5. governmentand depository institution deposits and cash items
4 .ATS, NOW, Super NOWand savings accounts with telephone transfers
S Includes borrowingvia FRB, TI&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items notshown separately
7 Annualized percentchange